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Abstract
Although some text processing techniques can be em-
ployed to intrusion detection based on the characterization
of the frequencies of the system calls executed by the priv-
ileged programs, and achieve satisfactory detection accu-
racy, high false alarms make it hardly practicable in real
life. In this paper, we modiﬁed the traditional weighting
method   - for suppressing false alarms by consider-
ing the necessary information between the processes and
sessions. Preliminary experiments with 1998 DRRPA BSM
auduit data show that our modiﬁed method can suppress
high false alarms effectively while maintaining satisfactory
detection accuracy, which thus make text categorization ap-
proaches more practicable for intrusion detection.
1. Introduction
It is well known that intrusion detection can be formu-
lated as a text categorization problem, and it outperforms
the approaches from machine learning, data mining, and
pattern recognition in terms of ease of use and less com-
putational overhead. Liao et al [4] ever applied K-Nearest
Neighbor(KNN) classiﬁer to label program behavior as nor-
mal or intrusive. Speciﬁcally, each system call in the pro-
cess is treated as a word and the collection of system calls
over each program execution as a document, and thus the
system call frequencies are taken as characteristic to repre-
sent program behavior. Although the text processing model
could achieve satisfactory detection accuracy, high false
alarm rate make it hardly meet demands in real life. With
the objective in mind and after analyzing the generation of
false alarms, we propose another modiﬁed weighting model
based on the   - weighting method. In our model, the
characterization of the system calls are not only depend on
the processes, information and attributes about the sessions
are also considered. Training data and testing data are an-
alyzed in the unite of processes, and the relationship be-
tween the processes are further analyzed by considering the
prerequisite and consequence together with time informa-
tion related with them, especially when a process is deter-
mined as anomaly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the
brief introduction of   - weighting method to intrusion
detection. Section 3 proposes our modiﬁed weighing model
and introduces two candidate methods for intrusion detec-
tion. Section 4 provides the experiment implementation to-
gether with the analysis and discussion of the result, and we
conclude in section 5.
2. Existing Weighting Method
When intrusion detection at the level of privileged pro-
cess is formulated as text categorization problem, each sys-
tem call of the process is treated as a “word” and the set
of system calls generated by a process is regarded as the
“document” [4]. The simple frequency weighting method
and   - weighting method can be applied to transfer a
process generated by the program into a vector. The sim-
ple model was established as follows:
Matrix    
 
, the collection of processes from differ-
ent sessions, and 
 




, the frequency of system call  in process .
 , the number of processes in the collection.
 , the number of distinct system calls in the collection.
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, the number of times that system call  appears in the
collection.






Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce and e-Service (EEE’04) 
0-7695-2073-1/04 $20.00 © 2004 IEEE


















Henceforth, statistical methods, classiﬁcation methods
andmachine learning techniques can all be applied to distin-
guish normal behaviors and anomalies based on the trans-
ferred vector space model.
3. Modiﬁed Weighting Methods for the Char-
acterization of UNIX Processes
In [4], processes were deal with independently, and a ses-
sion is labelled as intrusive once one of its process is de-
tected as anomaly, which thus increase the possibility for
the generation of false alarm. Additionally, information re-
lated to the time are ignored, so does the correlation be-
tween processes from the same session.
3.1. Session-speciﬁc Weighting Method
When a connection is established between two hosts,
several sessions or processes will be generated subse-
quently, in order to reﬂect the source speciﬁc differences,
we add the information of the session (such as Source Ma-
chine or session ID, which can be regarded as the topic of
documents [1]). Accordingly, the   - model can be im-
proved as following: 


  represents the process 
 from
session  at time   which includes system call , and it is up-
















  denote the process frequencies in the newly
added set of processes 

. The process frequencies can
be used to calculate weights for the system calls  in the
process 
. The model based on the fact that different ses-
sions include different processes, and various processes
have various system calls, consequently , it reﬂects session-
speciﬁc differences. The same system call may have differ-
ent weights because of different sessions it belongs to. To
speciﬁc the equation(2), the weight of the system call  in
the processes 
































is the number of processes in the current training set;
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 is the 2-norm of vector
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mation about the session should be carried in our method.
If no training data is available at     for a speciﬁc ses-
sion, we can set 


  for its all  or identify other sim-












happens when an anomaly detector is trained online.
3.2. Additional Measures
Brants et al [1] ever proposed several methods to im-
prove the   - model for detecting new events. Accord-
ing to the characteristic of our intrusion detection model,
we apply and modify some of these methods.
Firstly, the similarity between two processes can be











































































Secondly, due to the fact that the number of intrusive
UNIX processes are much smaller than that of normal ones,
the similarity between intrusive processes and the similarity
between normal processes should not have the same weight.




to all existing processes from the same ses-


















































 if we use
Hellinger distance. This step can be omitted if the train-
ing data are only normal processes.
Thirdly, based on the fact that the number of system calls
in the various processes might different, and inspired by the
work [?], we divide one process into several segments by a




 segments can derive from it, and we assume





 . The similarity of two processes is the maxi-























































and   is the similarity score from equation (7). In addi-
tion, normal processes and abnormal processes in the train-
ing data should be updated frequently in real life for re-
straining false alarms and detecting novel attacks. There-
fore, some time information should be considered. Here, we
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apply a linear time model [3], and we only consider the sim-






















the similarity to processes outside the window is 0. Of
course, at the beginning of the training, time window  
should large enough to include all the processes, with the
add of the new processes,  can be adjusted manually.
Finally, in order to minimize the false positive rate, when
a processes is identiﬁed as intrusive, we do not hasty to
treat the session it belongs to as an intrusion. As described
in [5], the attacks have causal relationship between each
other, and the correlation of the attacks could be formu-
lated as a connected DAG(directed acyclic graph) 
 
  , where the set  of nodes is a set of attacks,














triple     holds for some
stealthy attacks. Based on this assumption, when detect-
ing an intrusive processes, the current session are not taken
as intrusion immediately. Its neighbor processes or sessions
are also considered carefully.
3.3. Candidate Methods for ID
Many techniques have been applied in text categoriza-
tion, such as Bayesian Networks, decision trees, neural
networks, support vector machines, k-nearest neighbor ap-
proach, etc. In this paper, we only apply One-class SVM
and KNN as our approaches for testing the new model pre-
sented in the last section.
The idea of KNN is very simple, that is, when a new data
is available, the similarity between it and each of the train-
ing data is calculated using  distance or 

distance. The similarity score are sorted and the  near-
est neighbors are selected to determined the attribute of the
new process. A threshold should be set empirically in or-
der to calculate the average similarity value of the sorted 
nearest neighbors.
One-class SVM is one modiﬁed SVM, which identiﬁes
“outliers” amongst positive examples and use them as neg-
ative examples. After mapping between input data space
and high-dimensional feature space 
 via a kernel, origin
is treated as the only member of the second class. Then “re-
laxation parameters” is used to separate the point of the ﬁrst
class from the origin.
4. Experiment
In order to compare our modiﬁed weighting model
with the original  - model, we also selected the 1998
 data [2] as our experiment data, which con-
sists seven weeks of training data and two weeks of testing
data.
4.1. Training and Testing Data
Four days were picked arbitrarily out of ﬁve days that
free of attacks for training, and the left one for the normal
part of testing data. There are 606 distinct processes drawn
from more than 2000 sessions running on the victim Solaris
machine during the selected four training days, and 55 in-
trusion sessions in the other seven-week training data.
Data Set I (process) Data Set II (process)
normal intrusive normal intrusive
Training 500 0 500 20
Testing 5285 35 attacks 5285 24 attacks
Table 1. Experiment Data Sets
Two data sets for the experiment were formulated. Data
set I consists only normal processes, and data set II consists
both normal processes and anomaly processes. 500 out of
the 606 distinct processes were selected as the training set of
Data set I. The 3rd day of the 7th training week which con-
tains 412 sessions and 5285 normal processes was chosen
as normal part of the ﬁrst testing data set (some of them are
same in order to count false alarms), while abnormal part of
testing data contains all the 55 intrusive sessions. Addition-
ally, there are 30 distinct processes from 55 intrusive ses-
sions, and 20 of them are incorporated into the ﬁrst train-
ing data set to form the second training data set. 24 attacks
within the two-week DARPA testing audit data are incor-
porated into the 5285 normal processes to form the second
testing data set. According to our deﬁnition, each attacks
counts as one detection, even with multiple sessions. The
detection accuracy is then calculated as the rate of detected
attacks, and the false positive rate is deﬁned as the proba-
bility of misclassiﬁed normal processes(these two terms are
not rigorous symmetry here). The training data and testing
data are illustrated in Table 1.
4.2. Results and Discussion
One-class SVM and KNN were applied to the training
data set and ROC was employed to describe the perfor-
mance. For KNN methods, the number of nearest neigh-
bors of the test processes, , and the threshold, which is the
average similarity of the  nearest neighbors affect its per-
formance, and here it is induced by changing the similar-
ity threshold, while One-class SVM is induced by the var-
ious of  and ( is the variable of the RBF kernel func-
tion). The similarity is measured by Hellinger distance. The
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Performance of KNN and One−class SVM on the testing data

















Figure 1. Comparison of the Performance I
result using experiment data set I can be illustrated by ﬁg-
ure 1(KNN(m) means KNN method based on our modi-
ﬁed weighting model), and as the ﬁgure shows, the per-
formance of KNN and One-class SVM has signiﬁcant im-
provement using modiﬁed weighting method than using
original   - weighting method. The value of  varies
from 5 to 30, and we select the best performance(when
k=10) of this range for showing. Additionally, keeping false
alarm rate as 0, KNN/One-class SVM can detect 11/19
out of 35 attack instances using original   - weighting
method, while 15/22 out of 35 attack instances using mod-
iﬁed weighting method. To acquire the result by One-class
SVM,         and    when using original   -
model, while        and    when using modi-
ﬁed weighting method.
In the second experiment, the new available process is
compared with the intrusive processes ﬁrstly. Compared
with KNN method, One-class SVM had no great change.
In ﬁg 2, the value of  is 10. For One-class SVM, we only
adjusted the value of  and  to achieve the satisﬁed per-
formance.When keeping false alarm rate as 0, the detection
rate can achieve 62.5%(15 out of 24 attacks,      and
  ), and the detection rate reaches 100% rapidly while
false positive remains 0.38%(20 out of 5285 normal pro-
cesses). It is worth noting that original KNN can not detect
the DoS attack process table because of the normal appear-
ance of the processes issued by this session, but KNN using
our modiﬁed model can detect it easily with a lower false
alarm rate. In addition, the time window  in our weight-
ing model disclose the attempt of the process table attack
that intends to exhaust the process table of the victim ma-
chine by establishing connection every several seconds.
5. Concluding Remarks
Based on the special characteristics of the observable
subjects, we modiﬁed the original   - weighting model











Performance of KNN and One−class SVM on Testing Data

















Figure 2. Comparison of the Performance II
with the consideration of the necessary information. The ex-
periments show that our weighting model can suppress false
alarms signiﬁcantly compared with the original weighting
method. However, it seems that there is still a long way to
meet the requirements in real life. But actually, we can not
exclude the reason form the limited sample of the testing
data. Furthermore, we can conclude that the characteriza-
tion of the observable subjects is more important than the
speciﬁc method, so the effective description of the subjects
rather than the method is more meaningful for improving
the performance of intrusion detection that using text pro-
cessing techniques.
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